Structural holes in the local governments’ tendering activity network in a Hungarian subregion by Eliza, Bodor-Eranus et al.
177
Eliza Bodor-Eranus – Hanna Kónya – László Letenyei1
Structural holes in the local governments’ tendering activity network in a Hungarian 
sub-region
DOI: 10.18030/socio.hu.2016en.202
Abstract
The paper discusses the collaboration network of local governments through their tendering activity. 
Although many tenders in the Hungarian tendering system have given special attention to those joint ac-
tions that targeted cross developments of multiple localities, collaboration between local governments in the 
tendering activity cannot be considered typical. This observation is corroborated by our research conducted in 
2009–2010, mapping all tender collaborations by local governments in the Kaposvár sub-region, a total of 54 
localities. Our research identified a social network with structural holes of tender collaboration between local 
governments in the sub-region. Network structural holes allow the presence of a ‘third party’ that profits from 
this network structure. This paper seeks to identify which actors benefit from the structural characteristics of 
the collaboration network of local governments in tendering activity. 
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Introduction
Many tenders in the Hungarian tendering system have given special attention to those joint actions that 
targeted cross developments of multiple localities. Although joint actions are encouraged, collaboration be-
tween local governments in the tendering process cannot be considered typical. This characterizes small Hun-
garian localities, too, where the lack of infrastructure and lower representational power would justify strong 
collaboration and common interest representation. 
Our research conducted in 2009–2010, mapping all tender collaborations of the local governments of 
the Kaposvár sub-region, also describes this phenomenon. The Hungarian sub-region was selected because of 
the high number of small settlements that it consists of (except Kaposvár, all the 54 settlements had fewer than 
2000 inhabitants, whereas the typical case was under 1000). 
Our research identified a social network with structural holes (the term refers to the gap between close-
ly connected groups) of tender collaboration between local governments in the Kaposvár sub-region. The gate-
keeper actors―or in Burt’s terms opinion brokers―between closely connected groups (the tender writing 
companies), can benefit from the tender collaboration network characteristics of local governments in the 
sub-region. 
After 2010 the local government system and the territorial administration changed which affected the 
tendering activity of the local governments as well, especially in the case of communities with fewer than 
2000 inhabitants. Our empirical evidence refers to the 2009–2010 years, and we can only make some hypoth-
esis based on a couple of interviews on the consequences that the changes introduced after 2010 may have 
brought. 
Background
According to Vági (1982) before the regime change in 1990 in Hungary the hierarchy of settlements 
was associated with a centralized resource distribution system that strengthened regional inequalities. After 
1990, with the implementation of the local government law, decentralization began, which had an impact on 
the resource distribution system, too. This law established the structure and function of the local government 
sector (Pálné Kovács 2008) distinguishing it in four structural characteristics compared with other European 
systems: the organizational differentiation of the small settlements’ local governments, the differentiation of 
power, the arbitrariness of the association system and the building of a Hungarian-specific local government/
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state administration level. However, this law did not address the problem of the small settlements, while the 
empowerment of the localities was not defined specifically (Pálné Kovács 2008). 
Although Hungarian local governments have a lot of leeway, in reality they have to make many compro-
mises while completing their compulsory tasks. Tendering activity oriented to development funds was consid-
ered an optional task that could be tackled only after the local government had completed its compulsory or 
operating tasks. 
Separating the operating funds from development funds, in the early 2000s there were governmental 
resources that financed the compulsory operative activities of local governments: infrastructural funds (TEKI,2 
CÉDE3) and funds for financing those local governments disadvantaged beyond their fault (ÖNHIKI). This kind 
of financing was discontinued in 2010. In parallel with this kind of financing, the process of pre-accession and 
accession to European Union changed the system of financing local governments. The accent was moved to 
development funds for local governments at the beginning, with the help of SAPARD and LEADER programs, 
later with the help of applying for funds to the National Development Agency (NFÜ).
Our study was conducted in 2009–2010, when tendering activity of local governments amounted to 
applying for national operational funds (TEKI, CÉDE, ÖNHIKI) and also EU development funds through Rural 
Development Plans (NVT, ÚMVP, NFT, ÚMFT) and the National Development Agency (NFÜ). 
We were interested in the collaboration characteristics of small localities (up to 2000 inhabitants). That 
is why we conducted our research in the Kaposvár sub-region, where small settlements were overrepresented 
(except Kaposvár city, all the localities were home to fewer than 2000 inhabitants). According to the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office (KSH) in 2009 although 75% of the total number of settlements had fewer than 2000 
inhabitants (N=2381). The question is how do these settlements manage their tendering activity? What net-
work conditions define collaboration between small settlements in their tendering activity? 
Originally the Kaposvár sub-region included 77 settlements (as in Figure 1). However, the aggregated 
economic indicators for all the localities in the region was relatively good, influenced by Kaposvár’s good eco-
nomic indicators (low unemployment rate, high level of incomes, etc.). For this reason 22 settlements chose 
to secede from Kaposvár and to join Kadarkút, another sub-region. The Kadarkút sub-region had the most 
disadvantaged (LHH) classification (assigned to regions with poor economic indicators), making it possible for 
the local governments to obtain down payment discounts through tendering activity. 
The remaining 54 settlements in the Kaposvár sub-region also organized themselves into three micro-re-
gions: the micro-region of Igal, the micro-region of Kaposvár-Somogyjád and the micro-region of Zselic. 
Development goals of the Kaposvár sub-region were set out by the Kaposvár Multi-Purpose Sub-region 
Association (KTKT) in 2005, an organization founded especially to help the localities realize their development 
in concordance with sub-regional aims. Long-term goals were defined in connection with improving quality of 
life, infrastructural developments, environmental protection, economic developments, improvement of the la-
2 Development support for regional equalization 
3 Support for local development projects 
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bor market etc. Tendering activity of local governments and also of the KTKT were subordinated to these goals. 
Collaboration between settlements through tendering activity was encouraged by the KTKT. As the small 
settlements were having difficulties with tender writing because of their lack of knowledge and human re-
sources, the KTKT established a tender-writing organization, the Paktum Iroda, which assisted in the tender 
writing activity of the settlements at a very advantageous price.
After we finished our research in 2010, a reorganization of the system came to light, motivated by the 
new national administration and local government system changes. 
This reorganization resulted in prestige loss for the local political elites with the introduction of the five 
year cycle and reduction of the number of delegates in parliament. The tasks of local governments were also 
decreased by centralization (public education, some social care duties, health care, etc.) and magisterial duties 
were removed from local governments. 
In the case of small localities the possibility of compulsory associations was introduced, but it is exactly 
these localities that lost most of their functions (Pálné Kovács 2014). Furthermore, the law on sub-regional 
association and the Companies Act were repealed. Partly because of these changes in the studied sub-region 
of the 54 locality collaboration, the KTKT ceased to function. The failure of the KTKT is unique in the region, 
for example, the Kadarkút sub-region still exists. Even prior to ceasing it was a massive task to represent the 
interests in a unified way for a region with that many localities. Following the abolition of micro regions and 
sub-regions, in 2015 mayors unquestionably miss ‘belonging to somewhere.’ No structure remained of an in-
ter-locality collaboration, common interest representation from the old sub-regional level. Although some en-
tities do exist today, with the alliance of Somogyjád (the old center of the sub-region) there is a social network 
of 33 localities, a public education network of 18 localities, and a collaboration of 43 localities with the call for 
internal control. The Zselic micro region recognized as the most integrated one in 2010, is not a member of 
these associations.
Source: http://www.hiszi-map.hu/catalog/displayimage.php?album=42&pos=5
Figure 1. Kaposvár sub-region in 2009
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Theoretical frame
Report on the tendering field of local governments in the first seven year cycle of joining the EU. 
Theoretical and empirical research studies from Hungary have several conclusions as to the methods 
of distribution of local government tenders. There is a theoretical background as to how the funding of local 
governments adjusts to institutional transformation (Somlyódyné 2003, Kovács 2008, Pálné Kovács 2008). With 
the appearance of EU funds for local governments the number of studies that focus on the institutional dis-
tribution of sources (Perger 2009, Pálné Kovács 2011), and the effects of the funds distribution (Voszka 2006, 
Pálné Kovács 2009, Perger 2009a and 2009b, Balogh 2009, Hutkai 2009) increased. 
Separating the governmental operating funds from the developmental grant funds, Somlyódiné (2003) 
analyzed the allocation of national operational resources: in the case of sources like TEKI, which was abolished 
in 2010, and CÉDE, it was found that the principle of need and fairness prevailed. ÖNHIKI was another source 
of support used among local governments, that provided help for those who were disadvantaged beyond their 
fault, and although from the national budget came only a small amount of support, in 1999 one third of all 
Hungarian local governments had to rely on this support to ensure their operability (Puskás 2000). 
 In parallel with the national resources, which were firstly operational in nature, the pre-accession and 
later post-accession EU development funds appeared. The pre-accession process was intended to develop the 
institutional system following a bottom-up design and regional planning. It is relied on current need and after 
the accession would further support maintaining finance of the development. Perger (2009) calls attention to 
the inconsistency between economic indicators and socio-economic development: while the economic indica-
tors are favorable for Hungarian society, economic and social development is lagging behind.
 Analyzing the use of resources from a sociological perspective, Kovách (2007) concludes that the busi-
ness sector gradually gained ground in the financial funds raising system against local governments. Kovách 
named the process ‘project conceiving,’ in which the local governments are not able to perform the under-
taken tasks, and they are then forced to outsource certain duties in the form of projects. As a consequence 
designers, experts, advisors, managers, organizers, civil servants, and researchers gained greater opportunities 
and influence in the preparation and execution of the national and EU development programs. The ‘project 
class’ according to Kovách is the social group (not social class or order) that is able, with the help of its social 
capital, to legitimize their own influence or power in the project.
 The impact of resource allocation on regional inequality was investigated by Balogh (2009), who found 
that chosen projects are not reducing inequality. He also found that the individual’s position in politics played 
no major role in winning tenders. 
Organization theory of public administration and local governments 
Organizational theory of public administration and local governments became popular in the sixties (repre-
sented in the USA by Merton (1968 [1949]), and in Europe by Weber (1970) and Crozier (1964), while in Hungary 
Lőrincz, Nagy, and Szamel (1976) gave an overview of the contemporary perceptions of public administration). 
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The sociology of organizations approach to local governments was reconsidered when scientific interest 
was turned toward social networking of local governments. Local community studies continued―or rede-
fined―opinion leader researches, and by investigating local/community power and mapping relations among 
individuals/organizations (Dahl, 1958, Polsby 1959, 1962 for example) foresaw the social capital, embeddedd-
ness and social network approaches.
Recognizing the importance of regional power relations, in the 90’s scientific interest was shifted towards 
research focusing on municipality, regional, interregional and personal relationships (Pálné Kovács 2008). Due 
to the urban regime school, the focus of research was not institution or structural elements, but the personal 
relations and circumstances affecting behavior (Stone 1998 [1995], Stoker 1998 [1995]). This school/paradigm 
will gain even more importance in the (macro level) network approach in the governance literature. 
Governance literature’s foundational recognition is that the government is not the sole decision maker 
but the civil society is also playing an important role (Rhodes 2000). But it was this governance literature that 
brought up several public policy dilemmas such as defining the bound between cooperation and competition, 
the topics of openness and closeness, controllability and flexibility, accountability and efficiency (Jessop 2003). 
A new term metagovernance got introduced through which Kooiman (2000) differentiated three levels of gov-
ernment: first-order (problem-solving), second-order (institutional changes) and meta-order (governing the 
government). The appearance of transnational organizations―such as the European Union―can be connect-
ed to this approach as well. 
In the Hungarian sociology literature, rural studies also consider social networks (descriptive studies such 
as Kovách 2009, or regarding relations among localities, for example Kovács 2008 or Somlyódyné 2006, con-
sidering social capital such as Csurgó, Kovách and Megyesi 2009). A closely related study to ours is the ADAPT 
research conducted in 2001-2003 by Pálné Kovács Ilona on developmental policies and local development. 
The study emphasized the importance of intensive vertical relations among actors on a regional level. Results 
show that the density of relations within a region is higher than inter-regionally (Pálné Kovács 2008:279). As a 
follow up of the ADAPT study an OTKA research was conducted in 2008, that focused on the change of relations 
among regional actors (Pálné Kovács 2009b). Focusing on decision-making elites, 23 institutional and positional 
types were identified based on a sample of 200 respondents.
 These results lead us to the conclusion, that local governments are using their social relations, whereas 
civil society is less embedded. The comparison of the sectors also shows that local governments have an em-
phasized role, as their network is the strongest (among politicians, media and local development institutions).
In our study, we use the results of the ADAPT research as foundational while going further in considering 
the characteristics of social networks and with inspiration from Ebers (1997), we suggest the differentiation 
of two separate research mechanisms. The first mechanism is the micro-macro approach,from?the personal 
network we can deduce the inter-organizational network. Second is the macro-macro approach, where from 
the regional network we can draw out the inter-organizational network.
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Micro-macro approach of inter-organizational social networks
Micro-macro approaches are those studies that are deducing inter-organizational ties from interperson-
al connections. Social network analysis on a macro level (inter-organization relations) reaches conclusions sim-
ilar to micro levels (personal relations) studies (see Powell 1990, Burt 1992, etc.) likewise with studies where 
economic actions or inter-organization ties are deduced from the structure of personal networks (for example 
Uzzi 1996, Burt 1992 and others). 
Macro-macro studies are making conclusions regarding the inter-organizational networks, by relying on 
the environment, the regional networks (Sabel 1989, Saxenian 1994), research of regional and local govern-
ment relations (governance), collaboration or network studies of the development policy system.
From one hand, this research uses micro-macro approach when, during the analysis of inter-organi-
zational network of local governments, studies the network structure, especially the structural holes. In the 
inter-personal analysis, networks that have structural holes, gives opportunity to brokers for playing important 
roles. The role of brokers was first mentioned by Simmel (1921(1908)) who differentiated dyads from triads. 
According to Simmel, triads are always carrying the possibility of breaking into dyads, which also means that 
the third member will be the subordinate of the new dyad. In this case the broker is the actor who as a tertius 
gaudens profits, while maintains the distance between the other two actors. The uniqueness of this relation-
ship is the influence that the broker has on both actors. The most prominent broker literature is accorded to 
Fernandez and Gould (1994), who altogether differentiated 5 broker types (liaison, itinerant, coordinator, gate-
keeper, and representative). Burt (1999, 2005) mentioned the opinion broker term, which means a broker, who 
is carrying information from one opinion group to the other, taking advantage of the structural holes. Obsfeld 
(2005) introduced the tertius iugens term, who, unlike the selfish broker profiting from the lack of communi-
cation between two associated partners, rather initiates and facilitates the cooperation and communication 
between the partners.
On other hand, this research also takes into consideration the macro-macro level, when the regional 
relations between local governments and other tendering institutions are considered. Analysis also aimed to 
find out if a broker’s position at the micro level remains the same at the macro level.
Network structure is analyzed taking into consideration these two approaches. Since the network study 
of relations among local governances is not very popular in the sociological literature, the multiple functions of 
different organizations, as actors of a network, lead to definition difficulties.
Instead of terms such as opinion leader and opinion broker, which are already known from the special-
ized literature, our study prefers the notions of information leader and information broker. The information 
leader is the sociometric star, or the local government fulfilling the formerly used opinion leader role. The 
information broker is the local government that fulfills the role of a bridge as compared to the opinion broker 
among different actors of the network.
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Methodology 
During 2009 and 2010 we used qualitative methods (interviews) for investigating the relations between 
local governments. 
The investigated region was Kaposvár’s, where 54 localities constitute the country sub-region, most of 
them under 1000 inhabitants. The localities were grouped in 21 (district) notaries. Half structured interviews 
were made with the mayor or notary from each district notary: a total number of 21 interviews were made 
between 2009 and 2010. Previous fieldwork made in 2009 revealed that the notarial centers of the district 
notaries are familiar with the district localities’ tendering activity. The information regarded the number of ten-
ders, and the collaboration between local governments was comprehensive and valid for each 54 settlements. 
The half structured interviews contained many questions, in this paper we will present only the results 
referred to the network investigation of tendering activity.
Network questions referred to the collaboration with other organizations through tendering activity. 
In the case of notaries (where a single locality forms the notary) the questions referred to the locality, 
while in the case of district notaries (where typically 3 localities formed the district notary) the questions re-
ferred to all the localities in the district. 
We were primarily interested in the inter-organizational relations between local governments. Secondly 
we were interested in the relations between local governments and other tendering institutions. 
Through the investigation, and later through the analysis and interpretation the nodes of the networks 
represented organizations (local governments, tender writers and other regional tendering organizations).
The network investigation followed the section referred to the quantity of tenders, where the questions 
referred to the number and type of tenders of each localities. The interviewee was asked to list all the tenders 
(in the case of district notaries all the tenders of the localities from the district) in the past year.
All tender applicants were asked whether during the tendering activity help/consultancy or other type 
of collaboration was applied for with any other local government and/or other type of organization (like tender 
writers or local tendering agency) and interviewee were asked to name the organization they collaborated. 
The questions were: ‘During the tendering activity which organization helped you?’ and ‘Whose advice did you 
seek about the tender?’ The methodology corresponded with the name generation method, where a node 
generated other nodes connected to it. As a result we get not only the inter-organizational network of local 
governments in the sub-region, but the inter-organizational network of local governments and other tendering 
institutions, too.
The relation between the collaborators was also classified. In the case of local governments we asked 
what kind of relation the collaborating localities’ mayors or notaries have: formal (derived from district notaries 
or micro-regional relations) or informal (acquaintance or friendship). In the case of relation with tender writ-
ers we also asked why they chose the given tender writer, what kind of relation do they have with the tender 
writer: whether there are any other formal or mandatory collaborative terms and conditions (for example they 
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have to collaborate to each other because they have legally defined relations or they are involved in regional 
associations), whether the collaboration has regional, county or national level, and finally whether the relation 
is a formal or personal one.
In order to better understand the collaboration networks of the local governments we made 10 com-
plementary interviews with institutions regarded in some way as territorially important to tendering activity, 
such as with representatives of the regional development agency, tender writers, employees of institutions of 
regional importance (like Kaposvár University). We contacted all the regional development agencies, and the 
most mentioned three local tender writers.
The network relations were registered in a network matrix, 1 being the value for the existing relation, 
and 0 for the non-existing relations. Matrices were analyzed with Ucinet6 software, and networks were pre-
sented with Netdraw software. 
In 2015 additional interviews were made in the region to inquire what happened to the previously inves-
tigated localities because of further changes in the local public administration system.
Research findings
Structural holes in the collaboration network of local governments
As our research findings revealed, the network structure of local governments’ tender collaboration 
networks was highly determined by the type of inter-organizational relations. Classifying the answers to the 
questions ‘Why did you collaborate with the mentioned organizations through the specified tenders? How 
would you characterize the relation you have with the organizations you mentioned?’ four types of collabora-
tion could be distinguished in the Kaposvár sub-region. 
The formal network is when local governments were collaborating through their legally defined rela-
tions, such as district clerks, regional association (KTKT), and the micro regions (with micro-regional centers in 
Somogyjád, Igal and Szentbalázs). Not being able―or not easily being able―to change the members and the 
conditions/premises is the most characteristic feature of formal relations. The formal network shows the hier-
archy of localities in the administrative system where central nodes are micro regional centers (see Network1).
The quasi-formal relation connects those local governments that are not strictly following the formal de-
marcation. Associations with social implications, like development of education organizations, family support, 
social care, or sewage are not strictly following the sub-regional or micro-regional borders. For example, in the 
case of schools’ integration tenders 18 localities were associated in order to develop schools’ infrastructure. 
The main idea of the joint action derived from Somogyjád’s mayor, and also the president of KTKT, initially 
wanted to unify all the localities in the schools’ integration tender, but later 18 localities agreed to associate. 
Ties formed like this among localities can already suggest the kin- or negative ties among mayors to a small 
degree. The quasi-formal network differs from the formal network in the case of group members, but central 
nodes are very similar with those of formal networks (see Network 2).
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The quasi-informal ties are often relying on informal relations connecting local governments with tender 
writing or consulting companies. Not derived from national administrative system, and neither from infor-
mal relations, some tender writers collaborated with local governments because they had a good reputation. 
Gossip about the successes and ‘good’ relations of tender writers was spread among mayors. They wanted to 
reduce the risk of failing in a tender by working with those tender writers who had been successful in the past, 
or who had proper relations in the fund distribution system (see Network 3). 
Finally, the informal network brings together the aid, mutual information exchange, and opinion groups 
regarding the tendering activity where sympathy, friendship and acquaintance ties dominate. Compared with 
the quasi-informal network, the informal network contains relations from other sub-regions (see Network 4).
Analyzing the answers to the question ‘During the tendering activity which organization helped you?’ 
we found out, that formal and quasi-formal relations were dominated contrary to quasi-informal and informal 
relations. In the case of quasi-formal and informal relations mayors and notaries typically mentioned tender 
writers instead of local government institution in addition to their formal relations. 
Through the network analysis we visualized all the four types of relations in one network. Since the net-
work ties represent collaboration, we worked with symmetric relations.
Table 1 shows the relations reported by the mayors polled at four collaboration levels. The blue nodes 
were local governments in the Kaposvár sub-region. Red nodes represent tender writers (we did not obtain 
permission to use the tender writing companies’ names). Green nodes are settlements from other sub-regions. 
A total number of 18 tender writing companies, and 9 local governments from other sub-region were men-
tioned. The Kaposvár sub-region contained 54 localities, and two more nodes were added to the local network: 
a notary who played an important broker role in the relations between local governments (Jegyző), and the 
County Local Government (Megyei Önkormányzat).
Table 1. The four types of collaboration networks of local governments 
Network 1. Formal tender collaboration network of the 
localities in the Kaposvár sub-region
Network 2. Quasi-formal tender collaboration network of 
the localities in the Kaposvár sub-region
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Network 3. Quasi-informal tender collaboration network 
of the localities in the Kaposvár sub-region
Network 4. Informal tender collaboration network of the 
localities in the Kaposvár sub-region
Based on these networks three characteristics of the tender collaboration can be observed.
1. In the tender collaboration networks formal relations dominate. Even when mayors and notaries were 
asked to mention with which organization they would prefer to collaborate, they usually mentioned the formal 
relations they already have with the other localities. That is why in the quasi-formal and informal networks the 
formal relations are represented.
2. The quasi-informal and informal networks move from the micro-macro approach to the macro-mac-
ro approach, where there are not only one type of organizations (local governments) in the network, but 
also other institutions that take part in the tendering system (tender writers, County Local Government). The 
role of tender writers in the tendering activity can be very important especially for small settlements without 
knowledge and capacity for writing tenders. Collaborations between tender writing companies and local gov-
ernments were several: from the case where the tender writing company specifically asked local governments 
to collaborate in a tender (for example, the development of a children’s playground) to the case where a tender 
writer was permanently employed, being responsible for searching out tendering opportunities, writing ten-
ders and monitoring the development procedure.
3. The structure of tender collaboration network in the Kaposvár sub-region shows ‘structural holes’, 
which means that between densely connected groups brokers can provide information from one closely con-
nected group to another. The question is which actor was able to take the most advantage from the peculiari-
ties of the structural characteristics of the network.
Due to the domination of formal relations, collaborations within the sub-regions, typically the centers, 
had more ties. The degree of micro-regional center Somogyjád was 21 while Igal’s was 20. The most intercon-
nected group was the micro region of Zselic (with the center in Szentbalázs), where the local governments are 
permanently collaborating not only at formal, but at informal levels as well. The localities have similar geo-
graphic characteristics, they are representing their interests mutually and they apply for development sources 
together as well. The degree of Szentbalázs was 10 while Bőszénfa’s was 16, and while the second is not a micro 
region center, due to the operation of a school, it is connected to the district notary of Nagyberk, and the may-
or is also a member of several forums. The betweeness was the highest in the case of Somogyjád (1448,602), 
the most influential locality in the sub-region. Somogyjád was a micro-regional center, and a sub-regional 
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center, too. The mayor of Somogyjád was also president of the KTKT (the sub-regional Association) and a mem-
ber of the County Local Government.
The formal and informal tender collaborating relations suggest that the most influential or ‘information 
leader’ node can be well defined: the local government playing the central role in the sub-region (Somogyjád), 
the mayor being a member of many forums and associations. At this point was not very clear what role the 
structural holes can have in the network, and which institution can profit from this network structure. 
The laughing third party
The localities of the sub-region (without Kaposvár) submitted 269 tenders in the observed period of 
time, and from these they claimed the help of professional tender writers in 177 cases. At the time of our 
study there were 18 market based tender writers in the sub-regions, complemented with the 3 organizations 
responsible for Leader tenders. 
The sub-regional network shows that the tender writing companies were able to bridge among localities 
and even sub-regions which are otherwise not connected (e.g., P5, P15, P19, P3). Network 5 highlights the role 
of tender writer companies from the previous network and represents which localities (red nodes) are con-
nected with specific tender writer companies (blue nodes). P4, P3, P2, P10, P15, P6, P5, P14, P8 and P9 tender 
writing companies collaborated with two, or more local governments. The most integrated tender writer was 
P9, who managed the tendering activity of all localities in the Zselic micro-region. About P18, P7, P17, P16 
the interviewee did not mention other connections. What we can observe in this network is that some tender 
writers connected localities from different notary districts or micro regions with each other (for example in the 
case P2 who connected Mezőcsokonya with Somogysárd, or P3 who connected Mosdós with Hetes, otherwise 
connected only through the sub-regional center, Somogyjád). 
Network 5. Collaboration ties of local governments and tender writing companies 
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Results raise the question what explains the importance of the tender writing companies in the local 
government collaboration network, especially when the tendering system has service institutes that should aid 
the local governments in their activities (for example KTKT, DDRFÜ, etc.). It seems a viable answer that where 
the institutional system is not able to integrate the functions accordingly to the tender system (meaning the 
majority of small localities), the outsourcing of human capital, the trust in the professionalism of tender writ-
ers, and the hope of accumulating extra points during the application, the local governments reached out to 
tender writers. But it is also worth considering, that it was in the interest of the local governments to maintain 
a ‘network with holes.’ Perhaps a less dense network allows certain lobby activities, when actors believe that 
the successfulness of a tender does not depend solely on the quality of the application.
Regional networks―important, yet still peripheral tender writers?
The previous sections analyzed only the answers given by representatives of local governments to the 
questions ‘During the tenders which organization helped you?’ and ‘Whose advice did you seek about the ten-
der?’ The mentioned local governments and tender writing companies were visualized in the above networks.
However, in the regional tender collaboration network there are influential service tendering institu-
tions, which do not have the role of help giving in the administrative part of tender writing, but were re-
sponsible for information giving about the tendering possibilities and encouraging the collaboration between 
local governments by providing them with informational support. Analyzing the answers given to the question 
‘Which other organizations do you meet through your tendering activity?’ interviewees named the KTKT (the 
sub-regional Association: Kaposvári Többcélú Kistérségi Társulás), the sub-regional coordinator from DDRFÜ 
(regional development agency: Dél-Dunántúli Regionális Fejlesztési Ügynökség), associations due to previous 
PHARE and SAPARD programs (funding available in the pre-accession phase to European Union), now responsi-
ble for LEADER projects (Kopányvölgye Helyi Akciócsoport, Zselica Szövetség, Zselici Lámpások, Bányai Panorá-
ma Egyesület, Észak Kaposi Partnerek). The partner communities in these last three associations did not follow 
the sub-region grouping. Within a micro-region, these organizations could strengthen integration, as they were 
providing the smaller funds accessible for small grants.
In Network 6 blue represents local governments, red nodes are tender writers, green nodes are local 
governments from other sub-regions and the regional tendering institutions are purple.
The coordinators (P2, P10, P9, P3) who spread information among local governments 
about tenders collaborating with local governments that already knew about them. 
The itinerant broker (P14), who provided outsider help to groups otherwise strongly 
connected. 
Among the tender writing companies active in the Kaposvár sub-region, according to the Fernandez and 
Gould (1994) typology of brokers we could typically identify two kinds of brokers. 
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 In the event that these organizations were also included in the collaboration, they became the most 
central by the number of connections: KTKT and Koppányvölgye Helyi Akciócsoport with a degree of 55, Zselici 
Lámpások with 48 ties, Zselica Szövetség with 32, Bányai Panoráma Egyesület had 29 connections, while So-
mogyjád, the sub-regional seat had 24 ties. The betweenness was also high for these organizations, although 
with this indicator the brokerage role played by Igal, Somogyjád, Hetes and Taszár came to the fore.
Interviews and observations made in the research period lead to the conclusion that the history of col-
laboration has an impact on partner relations as well. A good example to this is the bloc from the Surány valley, 
as prior to detaching from the sub-region, the tender collaboration with localities belonging to the Kadarkút 
sub-region already existed from the beginning of 1990s. 
Localities from the Surján valley and Zselic decided not to maintain a legal organization, but to join the 
Zselica society, adding up to 32 local governments and 3 civilian members to the organization. This is follow-
ing the European Leader logic, a voluntary collaboration with no public administration obligation, building up 
from the bottom where everyone elaborates their own agenda. The Zselica society, with the detaching of the 
Kadarkút sub-region became the connection between the sub-region of Kaposvár and Kadarkút. 
Besides them, the Zselici Lámpások (the organization responsible for the Leader tenders), the Észak-Ka-
posi Partnerek, as well as the Koppányvölgye Helyi Akciócsoport also supported the collaboration. 
In the regional social network one organization had a central role, the KTKT. Localities adjusted their 
development to the regional development goals drafted by the association. A somewhat mixed opinion about 
the KTKT came through from the interviews. Most often interviewees emphasized that the size and diversity of 
interests in the sub-region otherwise collaborative localities romper from each other. The KTKT as an institute 
did not write any tenders, but operated a section―the Paktum Office―that for a symbolic amount helped the 
Network 6. 
Regional collaboration network of local governments and organizations active in the tendering activity
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localities with their applications. Interestingly, the Paktum Office and the KTKT merged during interviewing, so 
if someone sought help from the ‘sub-region’, it was likely that the help came from the Paktum Office.
Given its position, it is not surprising that the KTKT had the highest betweeness indicator: this was the 
organization that connected all localities with each other. Due to the number of ties, a similar position was 
filled by the sub-region coordinator of DDRFÜ, with the difference that he did not provide any concrete help 
in submitting the tenders. They are connected with the localities of the sub-region for the dissemination: he 
was informing the leaders of the localities about the tender possibilities. Interviewees recognized the infor-
mational importance of the sub-regional coordinator, yet they also emphasized, that the problem is not in the 
lack of knowledge, but lies more in not having enough capacity and human resources to prepare the tenders. 
Network 7 shows the connection between localities and tendering organizations, including regional tendering 
institutions, red nodes are localities, while blue nodes represent the other institutions.
Although, as tendering activity is considered, the micro regions were primarily all held together by the 
sub-regional association and local development organizations, because of protracted financing these organiza-
tions have had the most significant losses. Personnel changes at the local government brought new interests 
to the fore, causing protracted tenders to lose their popularity. 
The institutional background exists for the proper support of the local governments, but in reality during 
the tenders it was not these institutions whose help was solicited. In answer to the question ‘During the last 
tender, whose help did you ask for?’ mayors pointed to the tender writing companies. Network 8 shows that 
while local governments are members of different collaboration networks, typically they work with the tender 
writer(s) through their operative tendering activity. In the network green represents institutions at the region-
al-level that help the tendering activity of local governments, while red nodes are for local governments.
Network 7. Direct collaboration among local governments and organizations in the tendering activity 
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As a conclusion we can say that although there are formal connections between localities, the tender 
writing and administrative help for local governments was not shared among one another: they either solved 
it with their own workers, or they asked for help from specialist companies. The lack of collaboration among 
local governments is seen from the responses of interviewees about the consequences of competition for 
scarce resources.
Conclusions 
On the principle of equal access, information reaches all localities through several channels (newslet-
ter, homepage of NFÜ, tender coordinators) assuming that small and big localities are equally able to use the 
information. Howerver, the odds of receiving and implementing the information are different for every local 
government. Being informed or under-informed can highly depend on whether they have their own tendering 
department. Even if information gathering is fully provided for local governments, especially small localities 
have difficulties in realizing collaboration for tendering purposes and through tender writing processes.
Regarding the hierarchical structure we experienced a low level cooperation of local governments, based 
mainly on formal or quasi-formal relations. Two types of key actors were identified: one is the information lead-
er, and the other the information broker. 
In the Kaposvár sub-region the information leader role is fulfilled solely by local governments (taking 
us back to the micro-macro approach of the study). The information brokerage role is not very obvious in the 
network, where more types of organizations are represented (taking us back to the macro-macro approach of 
the study): it could be local governments, tendering local institutions, or tender writing companies. Based on 
the interview results, mayors and notaries reported that the greatest help in tender writing was obtained from 
outsourced tender writing companies. That is why they can be considered the laughing third parties of the col-
Network 8. Organizational collaboration of local governments, reflecting the frequency of collaborations 
mentioned in interviews
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laboration. Actors like the Sub-regional Association (KTKT), or local development organizations have important 
broker roles in the regional tender activity network, yet the local governments rely first of all on the help of the 
tender writing companies. It seems that in accessing the financing resources, the tender writers are informa-
tion brokers, the laughing third parties, who can exploit a bridge between two, otherwise not connected local 
governments.  
Meanwhile, tender collaboration developed in a unique way. The upswing of tender writing companies 
had started in Hungary after the regime change and more specifically with the appearance of pre-accession 
funds (Phare, Sapard). By 2004, the year of accession, already prepared mediator actors (mostly tender writing 
companies, i.e., profit oriented businesses) were expecting the challenges of the allocations of the EU funds 
and they had a giant role in having Hungary efficiently use the EU support funds among the newly joined coun-
tries. After nearly ten years of an open tender writing market, a slow closing down period came. The role of the 
tender writing companies proved to be ephemeral, lasting only as long as the learning period, in which local 
governments adapted to the tender system. It seems as if tender writing as an activity is not helping the local 
governments in the sub-region. Given that the execution of tenders also requires massive human resources, 
the small communities claim ‘package’ type of market services: contractor, procurement and tender writer. 
In their case ‘good will’ is an extremely important factor that at this point local governments seem to discov-
er only through their lobbying capacity and having acquaintances at ‘good places’. Survival in the narrowing 
tender writing market can only be achieved by companies that offer diversified activities and maintain good 
relations with local governments.
A special situation developed within tender writing support institutions that are not necessarily mar-
ket-based. In 2010 we saw that the KTKT had their own tender office (Paktum Office), and they offered help to 
local governments below the market price. With the demise of this association the office was also closed down. 
As a quasi replacement at the county notary’s office there is a Project office, that offers professional help to 
the local governments. 
After 2010 the local government system and the territorial administration changed, which has affect-
ed the tender collaboration network of the local governments as well. Additional interviews made in 2016 
revealed that KTKT was discontinued. Without this association, and taking into consideration the changes in 
administrative duties of local governments, and the relegation of tender writing companies, the formal col-
laborative network of the localities in the region has changed drastically. One can suppose that excluding the 
most influential node from the network, the accent will move to the following organizations in the hierarchy 
of relations: to micro-regional centers. But interviewees from the most integrated and densely connected 
micro-region reported the lack of any collaboration. The following research steps would be the investigation 
of collaboration in the sub-region and the comparison of actual network structure with that from 2009–2010. 
We can only suppose that without the hierarchical pressure quasi-informal and informal relations are on the 
rise. And it is still a question how the relegated tender writing companies influence the tender collaboration 
network of the sub-region.
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Annexes
Annex 1. Tender collaboration network data of local governments in Kaposvár sub-region 
(based on Network 4.)
ID Degree Betweenness Closeness Harmonic 
Closeness
Eigen-
vector
2-Local 
Eigenvector
Local governments  
from Kaposvár sub-region
      
Somogyjád (micro-regional  
and sub-regional center)
21   1448.602    249.000     48.667      0.172    114.000
Igal (micro-regional center) 20   1134.735    263.000     46.500      0.139    106.000
Bőszénfa 16    337.770    297.000     39.917      0.377    109.000
Hetes 15    583.370    285.000     41.250      0.094     64.000
Simonfa 11     93.796    306.000     36.750      0.331     87.000
Taszár 11    582.983    270.000     42.250      0.196     93.000
Nagyberki 10    287.923    295.000     38.450      0.146     71.000
Szentbalázs (micro-regional center) 10    556.304    283.000     39.667      0.301     98.000
Baté 8    233.704    300.000     36.950      0.096     59.000
Mernye 8    277.789    316.000     34.833      0.044     45.000
Gálosfa 7      1.702    337.000     32.067      0.261     68.000
Hajmás 7      1.702    337.000     32.067      0.261     68.000
Kaposgyarmat 7      1.702    337.000     32.067      0.261     68.000
Cserénfa 6      0.000    348.000     30.233      0.219     53.000
Gölle 6    138.188    334.000     32.367      0.026     32.000
Mosdós 6    120.072    290.000     37.500      0.131     69.000
Újvárfalva 6    150.198    304.000     35.500      0.078     47.000
Kaposkeresztúr 5     36.798    346.000     30.783      0.085     40.000
Magyaratád 5     23.781    333.000     32.033      0.035     41.000
Patalom 5     23.781    333.000     32.033      0.035     41.000
Sántos 5    133.989    313.000     33.667      0.127     43.000
Somogyaszaló 5    113.389    299.000     35.667      0.047     48.000
Szentgáloskér 5     10.243    319.000     33.167      0.045     39.000
Büssü 4     70.188    338.000     31.117      0.022     30.000
Csoma 4      0.000    350.000     29.783      0.088     34.000
Juta 4     86.776    315.000     33.500      0.038     40.000
Kaposhomok 4      1.736    328.000     32.000      0.130     43.000
Kaposvár 4     17.995    301.000     35.083      0.064     52.000
Kercseliget 4      0.000    350.000     29.783      0.088     34.000
Orci 4      0.000    338.000     30.867      0.030     34.000
Szabadi 4      0.000    350.000     29.783      0.088     34.000
Várda 4     26.523    311.000     33.917      0.046     44.000
Zimány 4      0.000    338.000     30.867      0.030     34.000
Zselickislak 4      0.000    368.000     28.333      0.148     42.000
Zselicszentpál 4      0.000    368.000     28.333      0.148     42.000
Fonó 3      0.000    372.000     26.867      0.026     16.000
Magyaregres 3      0.000    342.000     30.117      0.027     28.000
Mezőcsokonya 3     52.576    325.000     31.583      0.028     30.000
Osztopán 3    128.067    323.000     31.750      0.023     24.000
Somodor 3      8.033    302.000     34.500      0.045     46.000
Somogygeszti 3      0.000    342.000     30.117      0.027     28.000
Somogysárd 3      8.643    315.000     33.083      0.038     41.000
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Alsóbogát 2      0.000    330.000     30.500      0.025     23.000
Csombárd 2      0.000    364.000     27.483      0.018     19.000
Ecseny 2      0.000    397.000     24.500      0.006     10.000
Edde 2      0.000    330.000     30.500      0.025     23.000
Felsőmocsolád 2      0.000    303.000     34.000      0.039     41.000
Gadács 2      0.000    344.000     29.450      0.020     22.000
Kazsok 2      0.000    344.000     29.450      0.020     22.000
Kisgyalán 2      0.000    415.000     23.333      0.006     10.000
Bodrog 1      0.000    405.000     22.900      0.003      3.000
Polány 2      0.000    397.000     24.500      0.006     10.000
Ráksi 2      0.000    344.000     29.450      0.020     22.000
Somogyszil 2      0.000    344.000     29.450      0.020     22.000
Tamási 2     25.473    341.000     29.300      0.028     17.000
Local governments from other 
sub-region
      
Bárdudvarnok 1      0.000    367.000     26.733      0.012     15.000
Kadarkút 1      0.000    430.000     21.933      0.007      7.000
Kaposmérő 1      0.000    367.000     26.733      0.012     15.000
Kapospula 1      0.000    377.000     25.700      0.018     10.000
Kaposújlak 1      0.000    367.000     26.733      0.012     15.000
Kaposszerdahely 1      0.000    430.000     21.933      0.007      7.000
Kisasszond 1      0.000    367.000     26.733      0.012     15.000
Kiskopárd 1      0.000    367.000     26.733      0.012     15.000
Lengyeltóti 1      0.000    379.000     24.850      0.006      4.000
Tender writer companies       
P9 11    112.054    327.000     34.900      0.317     83.000
P2 5     38.382    349.000     30.400      0.032     31.000
P14 4    101.281    297.000     35.667      0.046     50.000
P15 3      1.000    328.000     31.167      0.032     30.000
P3 3     38.881    327.000     31.667      0.047     31.000
P8 3      0.000    372.000     26.867      0.026     16.000
P4 2      0.000    324.000     31.167      0.037     26.000
P5 2      9.000    372.000     26.267      0.006      9.000
P6 2      0.000    415.000     23.333      0.006     10.000
P1 1      0.000    452.000     20.383      0.002      4.000
P11 1      0.000    430.000     21.933      0.007      7.000
P12 1      0.000    430.000     21.933      0.007      7.000
P13 1      0.000    430.000     21.933      0.007      7.000
P16 1      0.000    397.000     23.683      0.005      4.000
P17 1      0.000    398.000     24.000      0.006      8.000
P18 1      0.000    381.000     24.767      0.006      5.000
P7 1      0.000    382.000     25.117      0.012      8.000
P10 7    400.000    348.000     30.850      0.059     20.000
Other institutions       
County local government  
(Megyei Önkormányzat)
2      0.000    324.000     31.250      0.032     27.000
Notary (Jegyző) 4     82.869    370.000     27.450      0.018     15.000
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Annex 2. Number of submitted tenders and the number of those tenders, that were submitted 
with professional tender writer help  
(Own data collection through fieldwork in 2009–2010 period in Kaposvár sub-region)
Settlement
Submitted tenders in 
the 2009–2010 period 
in Kaposvár sub-region
Submitted tenders 
with the help of tender 
writer or consultancy 
companies
Baté 8 6
Fonó 4 0
Kaposkeresztúr 2 0
Büssü 4 3
Gölle 4 3
Kisgyalán 1 0
Magyaratád 2 0
Orci 2 0
Patalom 2 0
Zimány 2 0
Igal 18 0
Kazsok 0 0
Ráksi 0 0
Mosdós 6 4
Nagyberki 8 4
Szabadi 3 1
Csoma 3 1
Kercseliget 9 2
Mernye 9 3
Ecseny 0 0
Polány 0 0
Hetes 11 4
Csombárd 0 0
Várda 0 0
Juta 0 5
Bőszénfa 17 17
Simonfa 18 18
Zselicszentpál 14 14
Zselickislak 10 10
Taszár 0 1
Kaposhomok 0 1
Somogyjád 8 2
Alsóbogát 0 0
Edde 0 0
Szentgáloskér 6 2
Somodor 0 0
Somogyaszaló 5 3
Magyaregres 0 1
Somogygeszti 0 0
Felsőmocsolád 0 0
Újvárfalva 7 1
Mezőcsokonya 6 1
Szentbalázs 20 20
Kaposgyarmat 8 8
Hajmás 8 8
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Gálosfa 8 8
Cserénfa 7 7
Sántos 11 11
Somogyszil 0 0
Gadács 0 0
Osztopán 6 3
Bodrog 0 2
Somogysárd 11 3
Total number of tenders 268 177
Annex 3. Regional tender collaboration network data of local governments in Kaposvár sub-
region (based on Network 4.)
ID Degree Between- 
ness
Close- 
ness
Harmonic 
Closeness
Eigen-
vector
2-Local 
Eigen-
vector
Density EffSize
Const- 
raint
r-Const- 
raint
Hierarchy
KTKT 55.000 4293.657 487.000     93.333 0.361 426.000 0.083 50.596 0.049     -0.049      0.079
Koppányvölgye 
Helyi  
Akciócsoport
55.000 6213.717 538.000     88.383 0.044 103.000 0.007 54.600 0.021     -0.021      0.021
Zselici  
Lámpások
48.000 2257.143 569.000     82.117 0.316 286.000 0.050 45.792 0.034     -0.034      0.042
Zselica  
Szövetség
    
32.000
   293.482 652.000     68.600 0.218 186.000 0.052 30.500 0.042     -0.042      0.023
Bányai Panorá-
ma Egyesület
29.000    762.312 583.000     72.833 0.209 193.000 0.052 27.655 0.044     -0.044      0.018
Somogyjád 24.000 1228.659 506.000     79.833 0.158 260.000 0.181 19.833 0.114     -0.114      0.140
Észak-Kaposi 
Partnerek
24.000    344.153 610.000     67.417 0.106 157.000 0.120 21.250 0.091     -0.091      0.084
Igal 22.000 3103.574 488.000     82.500 0.133 255.000 0.186 18.091 0.119     -0.119      0.139
Bőszénfa 20.000    115.155 565.000     72.833 0.244 316.000 0.395 12.750 0.140     -0.140      0.051
Hetes 17.000    539.098 584.000     68.667 0.107 172.000 0.147 14.606 0.104     -0.104      0.057
Simonfa 15.000     57.837 573.000     69.833 0.214 286.000 0.600 6.417 0.185     -0.185      0.055
Szentbalázs 14.000    373.134 567.000     70.333 0.200 292.000 0.560 7.000 0.163     -0.163      0.011
Taszár 13.000    500.201 519.000     74.083 0.143 220.000 0.321 9.300 0.139     -0.139      0.045
Nagyberki 12.000    493.820 528.000     72.583 0.123 192.000 0.409 7.500 0.180     -0.180      0.035
Gálosfa 11.000     44.439 579.000     67.500 0.178 255.000 0.782 3.500 0.210     -0.210      0.009
Hajmás 11.000     44.439 579.000     67.500 0.178 255.000 0.782 3.500 0.210     -0.210      0.009
P9 11.000     28.391 686.000     55.567 0.133 124.000 0.473 6.636 0.180     -0.180      0.019
Baté 10.000    480.391 531.000     71.417 0.102 174.000 0.422 6.200 0.194     -0.194      0.022
Mernye 10.000    182.152 608.000     62.833 0.070 137.000 0.356 6.800 0.195     -0.195      0.052
Cserénfa 10.000     44.339 580.000     67.000 0.161 236.000 0.756 3.553 0.214     -0.214      0.011
Kaposgyarmat 10.000     36.450 580.000     67.000 0.163 227.000 0.844 2.711 0.228     -0.228      0.010
Sántos 9.000    280.582 576.000     67.333 0.127 215.000 0.306 6.556 0.157     -0.157      0.009
Gölle 8.000    504.131 535.000     71.750 0.048 148.000 0.321 5.750 0.217     -0.217      0.040
Újvárfalva 8.000    218.963 607.000     62.250 0.064 131.000 0.250 6.250 0.191     -0.191      0.030
Mosdós 8.000     60.330 574.000     67.417 0.109 185.000 0.500 4.500 0.194     -0.194      0.014
Zselickislak 8.000     44.172 586.000     65.583 0.136 218.000 0.643 3.500 0.211     -0.211      0.002
Zselicszentpál 8.000     44.172 586.000     65.583 0.136 218.000 0.643 3.500 0.211     -0.211      0.002
P10 7.000    464.661 707.000     51.433 0.033 34.000 0.048 6.714 0.151     -0.151      0.002
Somogyaszaló 7.000    172.025 564.000     65.250 0.065 136.000 0.524 3.857 0.246     -0.246      0.017
Kaposkeresztúr 7.000     47.479 583.000     65.750 0.091 153.000 0.619 3.286 0.273     -0.273      0.015
Magyaratád 7.000     29.090 561.000     65.333 0.066 130.000 0.667 3.000 0.286     -0.286      0.010
Patalom 7.000     29.090 561.000     65.333 0.066 130.000 0.667 3.000 0.286     -0.286      0.010
Szentgáloskér 7.000     20.835 606.000     61.750 0.064 127.000 0.524 3.857 0.248     -0.248      0.050
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Büssü 6.000    337.892 537.000     70.750 0.047 146.000 0.600 3.000 0.315     -0.315      0.037
Orci 6.000    240.931 539.000     68.667 0.075 145.000 0.733 2.333 0.317     -0.317      0.006
Zimány 6.000    240.931 539.000     68.667 0.075 145.000 0.733 2.333 0.317     -0.317      0.006
Juta 6.000    172.026 605.000     62.000 0.056 124.000 0.400 4.000 0.218     -0.218      0.020
Kaposvár 6.000     47.394 580.000     65.750 0.085 164.000 0.533 3.333 0.224     -0.224      0.007
Kaposhomok 6.000     11.754 582.000     65.333 0.104 160.000 0.800 2.136 0.257     -0.257      0.038
Kercseliget 6.000     11.504 586.000     64.917 0.091 147.000 0.933 1.333 0.334     -0.334      0.002
Szabadi 6.000     11.504 586.000     64.917 0.091 147.000 0.933 1.333 0.334     -0.334      0.002
Csoma 6.000     11.504 586.000     64.917 0.091 147.000 0.933 1.333 0.334     -0.334      0.002
Várda 6.000      5.623 603.000     62.250 0.063 132.000 0.733 2.333 0.284     -0.284      0.015
Mezőcsokonya 5.000    161.796 611.000     60.583 0.049 112.000 0.300 3.800 0.252     -0.252      0.008
Osztopán 5.000     69.982 614.000     60.167 0.050 108.000 0.400 3.400 0.281     -0.281      0.024
Fonó 5.000     38.627 590.000     63.917 0.066 123.000 0.700 2.200 0.364     -0.364      0.011
Somogysárd 5.000     29.343 605.000     61.583 0.056 125.000 0.600 2.600 0.260     -0.260      0.007
P2 5.000     25.789 727.000     49.167 0.021 39.000 0.300 3.800 0.298     -0.298      0.006
Somodor 5.000     20.336 567.000     64.083 0.061 132.000 0.700 2.200 0.272     -0.272      0.005
Somogygeszti 5.000     15.203 584.000     62.500 0.053 113.000 0.800 1.800 0.354     -0.354      0.002
Magyaregres 5.000     15.203 584.000     62.500 0.053 113.000 0.800 1.800 0.354     -0.354      0.002
Kazsok 4.000    261.787 542.000     69.250 0.043 136.000 0.833 1.500 0.386     -0.386      0.008
Ráksi 4.000    261.787 542.000     69.250 0.043 136.000 0.833 1.500 0.386     -0.386      0.008
Kisgyalán 4.000    261.787 541.000     69.500 0.037 124.000 0.833 1.500 0.383     -0.383      0.003
Gadács 4.000    261.787 542.000     69.250 0.043 136.000 0.833 1.500 0.386     -0.386      0.008
Somogyszil 4.000    261.787 542.000     69.250 0.043 136.000 0.833 1.500 0.386     -0.386      0.008
P14 4.000    163.400 586.000     60.583 0.027 57.000 0.333 3.000 0.280     -0.280      0.004
Jegyző 4.000    155.263 748.000     46.250 0.010 19.000 0.333 3.000 0.352     -0.352      0.014
Kaposszerda-
hely
4.000     36.510 687.000     54.717 0.058 116.000 0.000 4.000 0.250     -0.250      0.000
Kadarkút 4.000     36.510 687.000     54.717 0.058 116.000 0.000 4.000 0.250     -0.250      0.000
Felsőmocsolád 4.000     15.203 568.000     63.583 0.056 125.000 0.667 2.000 0.288     -0.288      0.001
Kaposújlak 4.000     12.271 664.000     57.067 0.063 126.000 0.000 4.000 0.250     -0.250      0.000
Bárdudvarnok 4.000     12.271 664.000     57.067 0.063 126.000 0.000 4.000 0.250     -0.250      0.000
Kisasszond 4.000     12.271 664.000     57.067 0.063 126.000 0.000 4.000 0.250     -0.250      0.000
Kiskopárd 4.000     12.271 664.000     57.067 0.063 126.000 0.000 4.000 0.250     -0.250      0.000
Alsóbogát 4.000      2.236 616.000     59.500 0.050 107.000 0.833 1.500 0.392     -0.392      0.007
Edde 4.000      2.236 616.000     59.500 0.050 107.000 0.833 1.500 0.392     -0.392      0.007
Csombárd 4.000      2.236 628.000     58.833 0.047 102.000 0.833 1.500 0.361     -0.361      0.002
Polány 4.000      2.236 633.000     57.917 0.043 93.000 0.833 1.500 0.419     -0.419      0.005
Ecseny 4.000      2.236 633.000     57.917 0.043 93.000 0.833 1.500 0.419     -0.419      0.005
Kaposmérő 3.000      9.344 666.000     56.400 0.048 97.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Bodrog 3.000      2.236 636.000     57.167 0.038 84.000 0.667 1.667 0.445     -0.445      0.006
P3 3.000      2.121 654.000     53.267 0.025 37.000 0.333 2.333 0.382     -0.382      0.004
Csököly 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Gige 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Hedrehely 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Hencse 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Jákó 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Kaposfő 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Mike 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Patca 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Rinyakovácsi 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Szenna 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Szilvásszent- 
márton
3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Visnye 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
Lad 3.000      0.660 695.000     53.300 0.055 109.000 0.000 3.000 0.333     -0.333      0.000
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P15 3.000      0.500 658.000     52.583 0.021 37.000 0.667 1.667 0.432     -0.432      0.023
P8 3.000      0.000 680.000     49.750 0.019 22.000 1.000 1.000 0.560     -0.560      0.002
P5 2.000      6.061 664.000     50.883 0.007 13.000 0.000 2.000 0.500     -0.500      0.000
Tamási 2.000      2.135 618.000     55.033 0.014 21.000 0.000 2.000 0.500     -0.500      0.000
Kőkút 2.000      0.257 722.000     50.750 0.040 80.000 0.000 2.000 0.500     -0.500      0.000
Zselikisfalud 2.000      0.257 722.000     50.750 0.040 80.000 0.000 2.000 0.500     -0.500      0.000
P4 2.000      0.000 654.000     52.583 0.019 30.000 1.000 1.000 0.621     -0.621      0.204
P6 2.000      0.000 689.000     49.000 0.007 14.000 1.000 1.000 0.657     -0.657      0.001
Megyei  
Önkormányzat
2.000      0.000 656.000     52.500 0.016 32.000 1.000 1.000 0.588     -0.588      0.004
P1 1.000      0.000 903.000     35.133 0.001 4.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
P7 1.000      0.000 686.000     48.333 0.008 10.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
P11 1.000      0.000 862.000     37.717 0.002 7.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
P12 1.000      0.000 862.000     37.717 0.002 7.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
P13 1.000      0.000 862.000     37.717 0.002 7.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
P16 1.000      0.000 760.000     43.533 0.004 6.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Lengyeltóti 1.000      0.000 741.000     43.383 0.002 4.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
P17 1.000      0.000 763.000     43.617 0.005 10.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Kapospula 1.000      0.000 683.000     48.750 0.009 12.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
P18 1.000      0.000 719.000     45.467 0.005 7.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Nagybajom 1.000      0.000 724.000     50.083 0.023 48.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Pálmajor 1.000      0.000 724.000     50.083 0.023 48.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Patosfa 1.000      0.000 724.000     50.083 0.023 48.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Balatonszemes 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Balatonőszöd 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Balatonszárszó 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Szólád 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Nagycsepely 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Teleki 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Kötcse 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Balatonföldvár 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Szántód 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Kőröshegy 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Kereki 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Bálványos 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Pusztaszemes 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Zamárdi 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Balatonendréd 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Ságvár 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Som 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Nagyberény 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Balatonszabadi 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Ádánd 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Nyim 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Koppányszántó 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Értény 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Tab 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Bábonymegyer 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Kisbárapáti 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Fiad 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Bonnya 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Somogyacsa 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Somogy-
döröcske
1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Szorosad 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
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Törökkoppány 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Kára 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Miklósi 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Zics 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Nágocs 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Andocs 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Somogy- 
meggyes
1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Kapoly 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Zala 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Kánya 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Tengőd 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Sérsekszőlős 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Torvaly 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Lulla 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Somogyegres 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Bedegkér 1.000      0.000 693.000     52.767 0.003 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Somogyfajsz 1.000      0.000 765.000     44.717 0.008 24.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
Kaposvári  
Egyetem
1.000      0.000 642.000     55.583 0.027 55.000 0.000 1.000 1.000     -1.000      1.000
